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I. Introduction
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd., the court reinforced application of the presumption against extraterritoriality
under section 10(b) (“SEA Section 10(b)”) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“SEA”).1 The court also introduced a new domestic transactional test to determine
whether a transaction in connection with the purchase or sale of securities involving
foreign elements is governed by a domestic statute. This meant an end to the old
“conduct and effects” test devised by the Second Circuit and further developed in case
law.2 When deciding cases under the Commodity Exchange Act (the “CEA”), courts
traditionally look at the securities laws.3 Therefore, Morrison has had a tremendous
impact on the private actions under the CEA.
The focus of this Article is to analyze what is the appropriate standard to
determine if the CEA has extraterritorial application to private actions for fraud and
manipulation in the derivatives market involving a foreign element. The analysis in
Part I presents the “conduct and effects” test first introduced by the Second Circuit in
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook and Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell
and the test’s application to private claims under the CEA.4 Part II focuses on a twostep extraterritoriality analysis of a statutory text, and a two-prong test to determine
whether a transaction at issue is domestic, both introduced by Morrison. This Article
also analyzes the application of these tests to private claims under the CEA.
* Alina Petrova is a Russian qualified lawyer and holds a Master of Laws 2019 in
Business & Finance Law from The George Washington University Law School.
1. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269–70 (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(2012).
2. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 262.
3. Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. 789 F.2d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1986); 7 USC § 1, et seq.
(2012).
4. See generally Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).

Vol. 5, Summer 2019

58

Cross-Border Scope of Private Cause of Action Under Commodity Exchange Act

Finally, this Article reviews approaches alternative to the existing presumption
against extraterritoriality analysis and determines which is the most viable option.
II. Cross-Border Application of the CEA Prior to Morrison
A. CEA’s Rules For A Private Cause of Action
The implied private cause of action available for futures investors under the CEA
was first held by the Supreme Court to exist in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran.5 The Curran court, however, did not address the legal elements of the
action, such as “liability, causation and damages,” leaving a “private civil action given to
futures investors a mere shell.”6 After Curran, Congress enacted CEA section 22 (“CEA
Section 22”), superseding Curran. 7 A private right of action is afforded under CEA
Section 22 in the following enumerated circumstances: “(1) receiving of trading advice
for a fee, (2) making a contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery or the
payment of money to make such a contract, (3) placing an order for purchase or sale of a
commodity, or (4) market manipulation in connection with a contract for sale of a
commodity.”8 Only those plaintiffs who are able to show that they actually traded in the
commodities market will have standing under CEA Section 22. 9 Losses from the
transaction subject to the CEA should be trading losses.10
Private action can be brought against “persons other than registered entities and
registered futures associations,” and registered entities and registered futures
associations as well as their “officers, directors, governors, committee members and
employees.”11 “An owner of an actual commodity who does not trade futures contracts
but who experiences a loss in the value of that commodity due to price manipulation in
futures markets may not sue market participants.” 12 The first category can be further
subdivided into two classes. First, an investor can sue entities with whom he or she
has privity pursuant to a contractual agreement with such entity (e.g., futures
commission merchants or individuals providing trading advice to investors, or
brokers of non-exchange options).13 Second, entities with whom a plaintiff is not in
5. Donna C. Leeker & James J. Moylan, Private Rights of Action under the Commodity
Exchange Act - The Supreme Court Decides, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 307, 307 (1983); see
generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
6. Cynthia L. Moore, An Express Private Right of Action for Futures Investors: Does
Section 22 of the Commodity Exchange Act Afford Adequate Protection, 35 CAS. W. RES. L.
REV. 72, 72 (2016); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353 (1982).
7. Moore, supra note 6, at 73; see 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2012).
8. Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 270 (2014) (citing Klein & Co. Futures,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trade of N.Y., 464 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2006)); see 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2012).
9. Klein, 464 F.3d at 260; see also 7 U.S.C. § 25(b)(1)-(3) (2012).
10. Klein, 464 F.3d at 259.
11. See id. at 259; see 7 U.S. Code § 25(a) (2012).
12. Moore, supra note 6, at 86.
13. Id. at 86–87.
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contractual privity can also be parties to the litigation under CEA Section 22 (e.g., a
manipulator of the commodities’ prices). 14
B. The “Conduct and Effects” Test
Prior to Morrison, the “conduct and effects” test was used to determine
extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws. This test was called “the
north star” of the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence and was used for years to determine
whether protections and remedies contained in SEA Section 10(b) apply
extraterritorially to the fraudulent securities transactions occurring abroad. 15

1. “Effects”
In Schoenbaum, the Second Circuit introduced the “effects” prong of the
“conduct and effects” test by holding that if wrongful conduct has a substantial effect
in the United States or upon the citizens of the United States, a domestic court has
jurisdiction to hear the case. 16 The court applied SEA Section 10(b) to fraudulent
activities in relation to the treasury shares of a Canadian corporation whose common
stock traded both on the American Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange,
saying that it sufficed to apply SEA Section 10(b).17 Although the transactions took
place in Canada, the transactions affected the value of the common shares publicly
traded in the United States so it was necessary to protect American investors. 18

2. “Conduct”
The “conduct” part of the test was later introduced in Leasco.19 In Leasco some
of the fraudulent activities occurred in the United States, and the company located in
the United States was fraudulently induced to buy shares of the British corporation in
excess of their market value.20 Here, the court ruled that “if Congress has expressly
prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside the United States, even one going
beyond the scope recognized by foreign relations law, a United States court would be
bound to follow the congressional direction unless that would violate the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.”21
“Conduct” was further clarified in Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L. as “conduct
occurring in the United States” that was “material to the successful completion of the
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
1972).
20.
21.

Id. at 86–87.

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 257 (2010).
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968).

Id.
Id.
See generally Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
Id. at 1330–31.
Id. at 1334.

Vol. 5, Summer 2019

60

Cross-Border Scope of Private Cause of Action Under Commodity Exchange Act

alleged scheme . . . based on the theory that Congress would not have intended the
United States to be used as a base for effectuating the fraudulent conduct of foreign
companies,” and the “effects” element as conduct occurring in foreign countries that
had caused foreseeable and substantial harm to interests in the United States.22
C. Application of the “Conduct and Effects” Test Under the CEA
Pre-Morrison case law relating to the application of anti-fraud and antimanipulation provisions of the CEA followed the “conduct and effects” test. However,
even before Morrison, more often than not, courts rejected the application of the CEA
to the foreign-cubed claims (i.e., claims which are filed by foreign plaintiffs, against
foreign issuers), or other eligible parties, arising from purchases or sales on foreign
markets23 or foreign-squared claims (i.e., claims which are filed by U.S. shareholders
who purchased stock of foreign issuers on foreign exchanges).24 To assert jurisdiction,
courts look for domestic elements such as the trading of securities and/or the
execution of transactions in the United States.
In Tamari, Lebanon citizens asserted a claim against a Lebanese corporation
wholly owned by a Delaware corporation, alleging fraud and mismanagement of the
commodity futures trading accounts in violation of section 6(b) and section 6(c) of the
CEA.25 The trading of the commodity futures took place on a U.S. exchange and the
contacts between the parties occurred in Lebanon. 26 The Tamari court asserted
jurisdiction under the “conduct and effects” test. 27 The court held that “when
transactions initiated by agents abroad involved trading on United States exchanges,
the pricing and hedging functions of the domestic markets are directly implicated.”28
Each element of the “conduct and effects” test should be self-sufficient for a
court to assert domestic jurisdiction. 29 The conduct occurring in the United States
should be “substantial” and cause direct loss for the foreigners suing in domestic

22. Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984).
23. See ROBERT L. HAIG, 8 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 81:4 (Thomson West, 4th ed.);
Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the Private Right of Action Under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as Required by Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform
and
Consumer
Protection
Act,
U.S.
SEC,
at
ii
(2012),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf
[hereinafter Cross-Border Study].
24. Jennifer Mitchell Coupland, A Bright Idea: A Bright-Line Test for Extraterritoriality
in F-Cubed Securities Fraud Private Causes of Action, 32 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 541, 542
(2012) (citing Louis M. Solomon, Court Dismisses Both – Foreign Cubed as Well as – a
Foreign Squared Securities Claims Based on Morrison, Cadwalader Int’l Prac. L. Blog (Sept.
19, 2011)).
25. Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1104.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1107.
28. Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984).
29. Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir.1983).
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courts.30 “Substantial” conduct should be different from mere preparatory activities in
cases initiated by foreigners.31 The court in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. indicated
that “while merely preparatory activities in the United States are not enough to
trigger application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located abroad, they
are sufficient when the injury is to Americans so resident.” 32 Implementation of the
“conduct and effects” test prevents foreign citizens and corporations from using the
United States as a base to implement their fraudulent devices in the securities and
commodities market.33
D. Reasons Morrison Overruled the “Conduct and Effects” Test
There are several reasons why the Supreme Court repealed the “conduct and
effects” test. First, the “conduct and effects” test is characterized as unpredictable due
to inconsistent application of the test.34 Lack of predictability discourages investment
and capital raising.35 The court in Morrison cautions against attributing too much
weight to the test only because it was numbered among Judge Friendly’s many fine
contributions to the law and nurtured by his successor “under the impression that
they nurture the same mighty oak, when in reality tending each its own botanically
distinct tree.”36
Foreign policy concerns also favor strengthening the presumption against
extraterritoriality when interpreting laws. 37 The Supreme Court recognizes the
importance of deference to foreign laws in order to avoid clashes with foreign
jurisdictions, stating that the “probability of incompatibility with the applicable laws
of other countries is so obvious that if Congress intended such foreign applications it
would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures” in the
statute.38 The extent to which U.S. regulations can interfere with the policy approaches
of a foreign sovereign is important because different nations have reached different
conclusions about what conduct constitutes fraud, the methods of deterrence, and the
prosecution of the same. 39 In Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Automobile
Holdings SE, the court interprets the Supreme Court’s criticism of the “conduct and
effects” test as based on the Second Circuit’s own perceptions coincided about
“whatever the particular court thought to be good ‘policy’ for the particular case.”40
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
2014).

Id.

Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992 (2d Cir.1975).

Id.
Id. at 1000.

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 260 (2010).
Cross-Border Study, supra note 23, at iii.
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 259.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2011).
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269; see also Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115–16.
Cross-Border Study, supra note 23, at iii.
Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 220 (2d Cir.
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III. Cross-Border Application of the CEA After Morrison
A. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality: A Two-Prong Test
The presumption against extraterritoriality is supported by the “longstanding
principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.’” 41 The Morrison court not only upheld this presumption against
extraterritoriality, but also identified the exceptions to the rule and laid out a
roadmap to determine the applicability of extraterritoriality. 42 The court in RJR
Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community later clarified that Morrison introduced a twostep extraterritoriality test comprised of two factors: (1) the analysis of Congress’s
underlying intent to enact the law, and (2) the review of foreign policy concerns that
were on Congress’s radar when enacting the law.43
First, inquiry is made as to whether the text of the statute provides for the
clearly expressed affirmative intention of Congress to extend the scope of the statute
beyond domestic application.44 If there is no express indication of an extraterritorial
reach, the statute may not have extraterritorial application. 45 Morrison confirmed
there was no affirmative indication in the SEA that SEA Section 10(b) applies
extraterritorially.46
Prior to Morrison, well-established case law provided that the CEA did not
apply abroad. For example, after analyzing the CEA’s text and legislative history, the
Tamari court concluded there was no direct evidence that Congress intended the CEA
to apply to foreign agents, nor was there any indication to the contrary. 47 In CFTC v.
Garofalo, the court referred back to Tamari and concluded that the Seventh Circuit
had ruled, after a thorough analysis, that neither the CEA nor its legislative history
specifically authorized extraterritorial application of the statute. 48
After Morrison, the courts in In re LIBOR–Based Financial Instruments
Antitrust Litigation and Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko followed earlier case law
holding that “the CEA as a whole, and particularly section 4(o) and section 22, is
silent as to extraterritorial outreach.”49
Once it is determined a statute has no clear statement as to whether its
provisions can be applied outside the United States, the analysis does not end. The
presumption against extraterritoriality is not “self-evidently dispositive” and
41. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
42. See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
43. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265.
47. Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984).
48. CFTC v. Garofalo, No. 10 C 2417, 2010 WL 11245430, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2010).
49. In re LIBOR–Based Fin. Instr. Antitrust Litig., 935 F.Supp.2d 666, 696 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 271 (2014).
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“requires further analysis” because it is a rare case that a transaction or certain
conduct has no contact with the United States. 50
If there is no trace of express congressional intent, then the “focus of
congressional concern” must be determined. When enacting a statute, Congress may
be concerned with the place of deception, the place of transaction, the location of the
entity, the public interest, or the investor’s protection.
B. Extraterritoriality: Question of Merits or Jurisdiction
In Loginoviskaya, the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion
disagreed as to whether the presumption against extraterritoriality is applicable to
all provisions of a statute or only to its substantive provisions, i.e., those which
regulate the conduct.51
Extraterritoriality boils down to whether a domestic statute can regulate
conduct which occurs abroad. In other words, the determination of a statute’s
extraterritoriality depends upon the reach of the statute. 52 The Garofalo and
Morrison courts indicated that the question of extraterritorial application is different
from the question of subject-matter jurisdiction. 53 Subject-matter jurisdiction
pertains to a court’s ability to adjudicate claims under the statute in question. 54 Prior
to Morrison, the “conduct and effects” test was primarily used to determine whether
a domestic court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case. 55
For instance, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. , the court looked to
whether the Alien Tort Statute (the “ATS”) could reach the conduct of corporations
occurring in Nigeria. 56 The court held that the question of extraterritoriality is a
question of merits, and not of jurisdiction. 57 Therefore, the court held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to the ATS since the ATS is a
jurisdictional statute and “does not directly regulate conduct or provide relief.” 58
Therefore, claims under the ATS should be brought under customary international
law.59

50. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
51. Loginovskaya, 764 F.3d at 273; id. at 276–77 (Lohier, J., dissenting).
52. Garofalo, 2010 WL 11245430 at *4.
53. Id.; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254.
54. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254.
55. “We believe it is appropriate to rely on the “conduct” and “effects” tests in discerning
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists over this dispute. Both tests were developed in
cases brought under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.” Tamari v. Bache
& Co. S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984).
56. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2011).
57. Id. at 116; see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010).
58. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116.
59. Id. (dismissing the claims of the Nigerian residents, finding no rule in the customary
international law under which corporations are liable for aiding and abetting a foreign
government in human rights violations).
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However, contrary to the Kiobel holding, the Morrison court held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality is applicable to all provisions of a statute, not
only those which regulate conduct or are of a jurisdictional nature. 60 The
Loginovskaya court subsequently enforced the Morrison rule and applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality to both CEA Section 22 and section 4(o) of the
CEA under which the plaintiff brought her claim.61 Writing for the dissent, Judge
Lohier argued that CEA Section 22 does not regulate any conduct as such. 62 The CEA
determines who has standing to bring private actions under the CEA and which
entities can be held liable (i.e., defining the categories of persons entitled to seek relief
under the CEA). 63 Judge Lohier interprets Kiobel as endorsing “the distinction
between substantive provisions and those that only create causes of action.” 64 In
Loginovskaya the plaintiff argued that the presumption against extraterritoriality is
not applicable to CEA Section 22 and referred to Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft
Company. 65 The Blazevska court held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality does not apply to procedural statutes which do not regulate any
conduct.66 The Loginovskaya court dismissed this argument, stating that Blazevska
was decided before Morrison and has little significance now.67
C. Domestic Transactional Test
The court held in Morrison that SEA Section 10(b) focuses on the purchase and
sale of securities in the United States rather than focusing on the location where the
deception took place.68 A few years after Morrison, the Loginovskaya court concluded
that the focus of CEA Section 22 is clearly transactional because it limits an investor’s
right to sue to four limited transactions: (1) “receiving trade advice for a fee,” (2) “the
making of a contract of sale or a deposit in connection with any order to make such a
contract,” (3) “the purchase, sale, or order for a commodity interest,” and (4) “market
manipulation in connection with a contract of sale.” 69 Even though the defendant
corporation was incorporated in New York, the court expressly stated that residency
or citizenship were not relevant to the location of the transaction.70 Morrison clarifies
60. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261.
61. Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 277 (2014).
62. Id. at 276–77 (Lohier, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 272 (majority opinion).
64. Id. at 277 (Lohier, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 269; see generally Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 522 F.3d 948 (2008).
66. Loginovskaya, 764 F.3d at 272 n.5 (majority opinion) (citing Blazevska, 522 F.3d at
953).
67. See Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 272 (2014).
68. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269, 285 (2010) (noting that the
executives of the Australian bank’s subsidiary made misleading public statements in
Florida).
69. Loginovskaya, 764 F.3d at 272; see 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2012).
70. Loginovskaya, 764 F.3d at 273–74; Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v.
Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F.Supp.2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Alternatively, some statutes,
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that SEA Section 10(b) seeks to regulate those securities listed on U.S. domestic
exchanges and those securities which are the subject of U.S. domestic purchase and
sale transactions, thus overruling the “north star” of the Second Circuit’s
jurisprudence—the “conduct and effects” test—and introducing a two-prong domestic
transactional test which applies to the CEA.71 The domestic transaction test provides
that “a commodities transaction will be considered domestic” and governed by the CEA,
“if (1) the transaction occurred on a domestic exchange; or (2) the transaction itself is
domestic.”72

1. First Prong: Trading on A Domestic Exchange
As previously mentioned, the first prong of this test, the “domestic exchange”
prong, is rather straightforward—unlike the second prong which will be addressed
later on. To meet the “domestic exchange” prong, a derivatives contract must be
traded on a U.S. designated contract market or trading facility.
An issue which arises under the “domestic exchange” prong of the Morrison test
is the status of securities, albeit listed on U.S. exchanges, which are listed on foreign
exchanges and are traded more frequently on such foreign exchanges. 73 In City of
Pontiac Policemen’s and Firemen’s Retirement System v. UBS AG, the court ruled
that a bar on extraterritorial application of the U.S. securities laws, as set forth in
Morrison, precludes claims brought pursuant to the SEA by purchasers of shares of a
foreign issuer on a foreign exchange, even if those shares were cross-listed on a U.S.
exchange.74
Morrison leaves aside application of its provisions to the disputes arising under
the CEA. The seminal case which deals with the application of the Morrison rule to the
cases brought under the CEA is Loginovskaya. 75 In Loginovskaya the plaintiff, a
Russian national, sued under (1) CEA Section 22, which provides for a private cause of
action for violations of the CEA generally, and (2) section 4(o) of the CEA, which is the
anti-fraud provision of the CEA giving the right to sue commodity pool operators and

such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), remain focused
on the identity of the defendant. See Mitsui O.S.K. Lines v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871
F.Supp.2d 933, 938 (N.D.Cal. 2012) (quoting European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02–
CV–5771 (NGG)(VVP), 2011 WL 843957 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011)).
71. Loginovskaya, 764 F.3d at 272; Myun-Uk Choi v. Tower Research Capital LLC, 890
F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2018); Sullivan v. Barclays PLC, No. 13-CV-2811 (PKC), 2017 WL 685570,
at *28 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
72. In re North Sea Brent Crude Oil Futures Litig., 256 F.Supp.3d 298, 308 (S.D.N.Y.
2017); see also In re London Silver Fixing, Ltd. Antitrust Litig., 332 F.Supp.3d 885, 918
(S.D.N.Y. 2018).
73. See generally Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. L. REV. 196 (2011).
74. City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 180 (2d
Cir. 2014).
75. See generally Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266 (2014).
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commodity trading advisors (and associated persons).76 The plaintiff alleged that she
was solicited to enter into investment contracts with the defendants, a U.S. citizen
residing in Moscow, and Thor United, a company which is part of the New York
international financial services organization, the Thor Group. 77 The plaintiff also
alleged that the defendants misappropriated her funds and used her funds to finance
a New York real estate venture in which the defendants had personal interest.78 The
Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff’s claim, stating that she failed to prove that the
disputed transactions occurred in the United States.79 If the Supreme Court, however,
had applied the “conduct and effects” test, it could have ruled in favor of the plaintiff
because the defendants had been using the United States as the platform to promote
the “fraudulent devices and contrivances”, thus satisfying the conduct element of the
test.
To sum up, Loginovskaya and Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Limited v.
Ficeto have created the legal framework for the application of the Morrison
transactional test to the disputes arising under the CEA. 80 Both cases, however,
focused on the second prong of the test, i.e., the occurrence of a “domestic transaction”,
leaving aside the analysis of the “domestic exchange” prong.

2. Second Prong: A Domestic Transaction
Absolute Activist, a case regarding securities fraud, addresses the “domestic
transaction” and is reaffirmed by Loginovskaya for transactions governed by the CEA.81
In Absolute Activist, the court explained what it means for the purchase and sale of
securities to occur in the United States. The purchase and sale transaction is domestic
if either (1) title to the securities is transferred in the United States; or (2) irrevocable
liability attaches in the United States, meaning the purchaser incurs the irrevocable
liability within the United States to take and pay for a security, or the seller incurs
irrevocable liability within the United States to deliver a security.82 The court looked at
the definitions of “purchase” and “sell” in the SEA and concluded that a “sale” consists
of the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price, and a “purchase and sale”
takes place when the parties become bound to effectuate a transaction.83 The parties to
a transaction are bound when each are obligated to perform what they agreed to
perform even though their performance follows their obligation after some time.
76. Id. at 271–72.
77. Id. at 268–69.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 275.
80. See generally id.; see also Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677
F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012).
81. See generally Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266 (2014); see also Absolute
Activist Value Master Fund Ltd., 677 F.3d at 60.
82. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd., 677 F.3d at 69; Myun-Uk Choi v. Tower
Research Capital LLC, 890 F.3d 60, 68–69 (2d Cir. 2018).
83. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd., 677 F.3d at 67.
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The court ties “binding” and “irrevocability” with the notion of “commitment” which
points to the moment of a meeting of the minds in the classic contractual sense.84
In Myun-Uk Choi v. Tower Research Capital LLC, the court ruled that the
Korean investors made it “plausible” that their transactions were “domestic
transactions” and therefore subject to the anti-manipulation provisions of the CEA.85
The plaintiffs had placed their orders for futures trading on the Korean exchange night
market and those orders were matched with counterparties on the CME Globex
electronic trading platform located in Illinois.86 The plaintiffs alleged that the New York
high-frequency trading firm and its founder engaged in manipulative spoofing
transactions on the Korean exchange night market by trading on the CME Globex.87
The defendants argued that since the clearing and settlement of the transactions
occurred in Korea, the second prong of Morrison was not met.88 The court ruled that
the Korean investors and their counterparties assumed the irrevocable liability when
their orders were matched on CME Globex but not during the clearing or
settlement.89 In other words, a meeting of the minds occurred in the United States.
When determining whether title transferred or irrevocable liability attached
in the United States, the court in Absolute Activist looked to, inter alia, the facts of
“the formation of contracts, the placement of purchase orders, the passing of title, or
the exchange of money.” 90 The mere transfer of the money to the bank account
maintained in the United States was not enough to adequately plead that a “domestic
transaction” had taken place. 91 The plaintiffs in Absolute Activist, foreign hedge
funds which bought securities of the thinly capitalized U.S.-based companies, argued
that for the “domestic transaction” prong to be met, the court should consider such
factors as the location of the broker-dealer, the identity of the securities and the
identity of their issuer, and whether the defendants engaged in any conduct in the
United States.92 The court rejected these factors, saying that the Morrison standard
focuses on domestic transactions in unlisted securities but not in transactions in
domestic securities.93
In City of Pontiac Policemen’s and Firemen’s Retirement System, the court, when
analyzing whether the irrevocable liability attached in the United States, held that
“mere placement of a buy order in the United States for the purchase of foreign
securities on a foreign exchange is not sufficient to allege that a purchaser incurred

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id. at 67–68.
Myun-Uk Choi, 890 F.3d at 68.
Id. at 63–64.
Id. at 64.

Myun-Uk Choi v. Tower Research Capital LLC, 890 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 2018).
Id. at 67.
Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 2012).
Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 275 (2014).
Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd., 677 F.3d at 68–69.
Id. at 69.

Vol. 5, Summer 2019

68

Cross-Border Scope of Private Cause of Action Under Commodity Exchange Act

irrevocable liability in the United States, such that the Securities Exchange Act governs
the purchase of those securities.”94
In between Morrison and Absolute Activist, various cases have showed that
courts looked at the identity of the securities and the issuer invoking antiextraterritoriality presumption for private actions involving securities of foreign
issuers.95 In Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, the court echoed Morrison, emotionally
calling the “conduct and effects” test “dead letter” and dismissing the American
investor’s action brought under SEA Section 10(b) against Credit Suisse.96 The court
seemed to be very cautious about misreading the transactional test and restoring the
“conduct and effects” test in light of Morrison, and concluding that SEA Section 10(b)
applies to foreign securities traded on foreign exchanges even if purchased or sold by
American investors, or even if some aspects of the transaction occurred in the United
States.97 By doing so, the court seemed to avoid at any cost returning to the “conduct
and effects” test and contravened the Morrison domestic transaction test, saying “that
the Supreme Court considered and was entirely aware that its new test would
preclude extraterritorial application of SEA Section 10(b) to foreign securities
transactions involving alleged wrongful conduct that could cause harm to American
investors in the United States, or that entail the occurrence of some acts in the United
States in furtherance of the purchase or sale.”98
The location of the broker-dealer is important only in the event that it “carries
out tasks that irrevocably bind the parties to buy or sell securities.”99 In Myun-Uk
Choi and Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Company ,
the courts interpreted Morrison in a way that if there is a domestic transaction in the
meaning of the Morrison test, this fact alone is sufficient to rebut the presumption
against extraterritoriality and invoke the application of the SEA or the CEA, as the
case may be.100
94. City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 181 (2d
Cir. 2014).
95. “‘Domestic transactions’ or ‘purchases or sales’ . . . in the United States means
purchases and sales of securities explicitly solicited by the issuer within the United States
rather than transactions in foreign-traded securities where the ultimate purchaser or seller
has physically remained in the United States.” Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. CV 10–
0922, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1 (C.D.Cal. 2010).
96. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F.Supp.2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
97. Id. at 626.
98. Id.
99. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2012).
100. “Morrison clearly provided that the ‘domestic transaction’ prong is an independent
and sufficient basis for application of the Securities Exchange Act to purportedly foreign
conduct.” Myun-Uk Choi v. Tower Research Capital LLC, 890 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2018).
“While Morrison held that a domestic purchase or sale is necessary (and, as far as that
opinion reveals, sufficient) for Section 10(b) to apply to a security that is not traded on a
domestic securities exchange, it did not have occasion to discuss what it means for a purchase
or sale to be ‘made in the United States.” Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v.
Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F.Supp.2d 166, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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D. Application of the Securities Laws to the CEA

Morrison is a seminal case for the extraterritorial application of the securities
laws; however, can the Morrison test be applied to transactions that are subject to

the CEA? Traditionally, the rules established in securities regulation applied to
transactions subject to the CEA. For example, in Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., the
court said that “traditionally, courts have looked to the securities laws when called
upon to interpret similar provisions of the CEA.”101 Also, the court in In re North Sea
Brent Crude Oil Futures Litigation stated that the framework and test for
determining whether a transaction that does not involve a security listed on a
domestic exchange will be considered domestic, and, thus, subject to the SEA, applies
to private actions brought for violations of the CEA. 102 However, the application of
the Morrison test outside the securities context is not immediately clear.
In Loginovskaya, Judge Lohier wrote in his dissent that the Morrison rule is
inapplicable to actions brought under section 4(o) of the CEA (the CEA’s primary antifraud provision). 103 To review, SEA Section 10(b) provides that, in order to prove
fraud, the plaintiff must show that deception took place in connection with a sale and
purchase of securities.104 Section 4(o) of the CEA does not require that the transaction
occur, prohibiting fraud without any requirement that it should be in connection with
any particular transaction or event.105 Therefore, in his dissent, Judge Lohier says
that the focus of the CEA is on regulated commodity entities, “the market’s
ambassadors”, rather than on the transactions themselves. 106
E. Extraterritorial Outreach of CFTC’s Enforcement Actions After Morrison
The Morrison transactional test extends to claims of private parties but does
not touch upon the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (the “CFTC”)
enforcement authority. The approach taken in relation to the securities laws is
similar. In reaction to Morrison, Congress passed section 929P(b)(2) of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), which
provides “the necessary affirmative indication of extraterritoriality for Section 10(b)
actions involving transnational securities fraud brought by [the SEC or the U.S.
Department of Justice.]”107 In particular, section 929P(b)(2) pertains to fraud involving
“conduct within the United States that constitutes a significant step in furtherance of
the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and
101.
102.
2017).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. 789 F.2d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1986).

In re North Sea Brent Crude Oil Futures Litig., 256 F.Supp.3d 298, 307 (S.D.N.Y.
Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 276 (2014) (Lohier, J., dissenting).

Id. at 280 n.4.
Id.
Id. at 281.

Cross-Border Study, supra note 23, at i.
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involves only foreign investors; or conduct occurring outside the United States that has
a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.” 108 The text of section
929P(b)(2) reinforces the “conduct and effects” test devised by the Second Circuit,
limiting the test only to the SEC’s enforcement actions and leaving private actions
aside.109 The SEC was granted authority to bring actions to rectify violations of the
SEA, Securities Act, 110 or Investment Advisors Act 111 stemming from specified
extraterritorial conduct.112
The Dodd-Frank Act changed the CEA’s impact by including the provisions
which address the outreach of CFTC’s enforcement actions over extraterritorial
activities. 113 The Dodd-Frank Act has established the comprehensive regulatory
framework to implement the goals established during the Pittsburg G20 summit, such
as requiring standardized swaps to be cleared through central counterparties or
clearinghouses and traded on transparent, regulated platforms; establishing an
oversight system over swap dealers and major swap participants; regularly reporting
swaps market data in order to facilitate greater transparency; and enhancing
regulatory oversight.114 The CFTC was granted jurisdiction over swaps, 115 and section
2(i) of the CEA established that the Dodd-Frank Act “shall not apply to activities
outside the United States unless those activities have a direct and significant
connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States.” 116
Under the current regulatory regime, the CFTC has authority to bring
enforcement actions over a much broader range of issues than private parties. The
CEA is “a remedial statute that serves the crucial purpose of protecting the innocent
individual investor, who may know little about the intricacies and complexities of the
commodities market, from being misled or deceived.” 117 A private right of action is an
important remedy available for investors. 118 In a statement issued by former
108. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, § 929P(b)(2) (2010).
109. Id.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2012).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (2012).
112. Michael L. Spafford & Daren F. Stanaway, The Extraterritorial Reach of the
Commodity Exchange Act in the Wake of Morrison and Dodd-Frank , 37 FUTURES &
DERIVATIVES LAW REPORT 1, 2 (2017), available at https://www.paulhastings.com/
docs/default-source/default-documentlibrary/fdlr_37_7_art1.pdf.
113. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, § 929P(b)(2) (2010).
114. J. Christopher Giancarlo, Chairman, CFTC, Cross-Border Swaps Regulation Version
2.0. A Risk-Based Approach with Deference to Comparable Non-U.S. Regulation White Paper
5–6
(Oct.
1,
2018),
available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/201810/Whitepaper_CBSR100118_0.pdf.
115. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2012).
116. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i)(1)–(2) (2012).
117. Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 270 (2014).
118. “Meritorious private actions have long been recognized as an important supplement
to civil and criminal law-enforcement actions.” Cross-Border Study, supra note 23, at i.
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Chairman of the CFTC, Timothy Massad, to the CFTC, Massad opined that “private
rights of action have been instrumental in helping to protect market participants and
deter bad actors. These actions can also augment the limited enforcement resources
of the CFTC, and serve the public interest by allowing harmed parties to seek
damages in instances where the CFTC lacks the resources to do so on their behalf.” 119
However, the extent to which government authority can bring enforcement actions is
broader than the one in disposition of the private parties under the SEA and the CEA.
The CEA contains an affirmative indication that it applies to extraterritorial
transactions concerning suits brought by the CFTC itself. 120 The court held in
Sullivan v. Barclays PLC that the CEA “draws a distinction between the
extraterritoriality limits on a private action and enforcement actions brought by the
CFTC itself.”121 In CFTC v. Vision Financial Partners, LLC, the CFTC brought an
action against commodity trading advisors for an alleged fraudulent scheme
involving foreign investors in binary options traded through foreign trading
platforms.122 The defendants argued that based on Morrison the CFTC could not sue
them because the alleged violations concerned transactions between non-U.S.
residents and non-U.S. electronic platforms.123 However, the extraterritorial reach of
a private right of action under the CEA is a “different, and somewhat more
complicated question” than that of a suit brought by the CFTC. 124 The court ruled
that under the CEA the CFTC had authority to sue the commodity trading advisors
operating in Florida for alleged fraudulent activities involving foreign investors in
binary options traded through foreign trading platforms. 125 The court determined
that the CFTC could bring an action under the CEA concerning extraterritorial
transactions so long as the fraud was committed by a person located in the United
States.126

119. Statement of Chairman Timothy Massad in Support of the Proposed Amendment to
the
RTO-ISO
Order,
CFTC
(May
10,
2016),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/massadstatement051016.
120. 7 U.S.C. § 6(b)(2) (2012); see generally CFTC v. Vision Fin. Partners, LLC, 232
F.Supp.3d 1287 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2017).
121. Sullivan v. Barclays PLC, No. 13-CV-2811 (PKC), 2017 WL 685570, at 29 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (citing Loginovskaya, 764 F.3d at 275).
122. Vision Fin. Partners, LLC, 232 F.Supp.3d at 1131 (stating that the CFTC “adopts
rules and regulations proscribing fraud,” and other rules, even if they concern instruments
or transactions “made on or to be made subject to the rules of a board of trade, exchange, or
market located outside the United States,” so long as that fraud or other regulated behavior
is committed by “any person located in the United States”); see also 7 U.S.C. § 6(b)(2) (2012).
The CFTC can bring an action over “any practice constituting a violation of any provision of
or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder.” 7 U.S.C. 13c (2012).
123. Vision Fin. Partners, LLC, at 1131.
124. WOLOWITZ & HOUPT, 6 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 71:4 (3d ed.).
125. Vision Fin. Partners, LLC, 232 F.Supp.3d at 1131.
126. Id.
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IV. Alternative Extraterritoriality Tests Under the CEA
A. The “Predominantly Foreign” Exception
Interpreting Morrison, the Second Circuit concluded in Parkcentral that even
though the test’s second prong was a necessary element of a domestic SEA Section
10(b) claim, it is not in itself sufficient to invoke a SEA Section 10(b) violation. 127
Emphasizing that the Supreme Court in Morrison never said that application of SEA
Section 10(b) is deemed domestic whenever the domestic transaction is present,128 the
court came up with the “predominantly foreign” exception. 129 The plaintiffs in
Parkcentral sued Porsche, a German company, for publicly misleading statements
about its takeover of VW, also a German company whose shares were trading on
foreign exchanges and did not trade in the United States.130 The plaintiffs claimed they
relied on these statements when making security-based swap agreements. 131 Many
facts in Parkcentral pointed to the foreign nature of the transactions. For example, the
defendants gave the misleading statements abroad and the swap agreements at issue
referenced shares of the foreign company traded abroad. 132 Noting that the swap
transactions were concluded in the United States, and additionally taking into
consideration that some of the plaintiffs’ counterparties were New-York based entities,
the court held that “on careful consideration of Morrison’s words and arguments as
applied to the facts of this case, we conclude that while that case unmistakably made
a domestic securities transaction (or transaction in a domestically listed security)
necessary to a properly domestic invocation of SEA Section 10(b), such a transaction is
not alone sufficient to state a properly domestic claim under the statute.”133
The “predominantly foreign” exception was picked up by a New York district
court and applied in the context of the CEA. In In Re North Sea Brent Crude Oil
Litigation, the plaintiffs, residents of the United States, alleged price manipulation of
Brent crude oil futures and derivative contracts traded on NYMEX.134 Even though the
first step of the Morrison analysis was met (i.e., contracts were trading on the domestic
exchange), the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims as “impermissibly
extraterritorial.”135 The fact that the futures traded in the United States was not a
sufficient factor to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality because the pricereporting agency which collected information about the Brent crude oil prices had its
127.
2014).
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
2014).
133.
134.
2017).
135.

Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 215 (2d Cir.

Id.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 201.
Id.

Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir.

Id. at 215.
In re North Sea Brent Crude Oil Futures Litig., 256 F.Supp.3d 298, 302 (S.D.N.Y.
Id. at 306.
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principal place of business in London, and the defendants provided it with “allegedly
manipulative and misleading reporting . . . about physical Brent crude oil transactions
conducted entirely outside of the United States.” 136 Therefore, the court held that
these factors constituted the “predominantly foreign” element which precluded
extraterritorial application of the CEA to the claims.137
In In Re London Silver Fixing, Ltd. Antitrust Litigation, investors claimed price
manipulation of physical silver and silver-denominated financial products by foreign
exchanges and precious metal traders. 138 The transactions in silver-denominated
financial instruments occurred on domestic exchanges, but the court found that the
price manipulation did not directly affect the prices for products traded on domestic
exchanges. 139 The court looked at the “frequency of manipulation, persistence of
impact of episodic manipulation in relevant silver market, or that investors traded
close in time to alleged manipulation”, 140 and found that the price manipulation’s
impact on the products and contracts traded on the U.S. exchange was unable to
overcome the “predominantly foreign” test.141 After Parkcentral, case law established
that, in conducting the extraterritoriality analysis of private actions under the CEA,
courts should first look to whether a transaction satisfies any of the Morrison
transactional test’s prongs (i.e., whether the transaction occurred on a domestic
exchange or the transaction itself is domestic). If the Morrison test is met, the court
then should analyze if the plaintiff’s claims are so predominantly foreign that they are
impermissibly extraterritorial.
In justifying the application of the “predominantly foreign” exception in cases
where derivative contracts are traded in the United States and either of the elements
of the Morrison test is satisfied, the court is cautiously cognizant of the possible
conflict between domestic laws and foreign laws. 142 The court is set to avoid
individuals and entities from being subject to multiple, and potentially incompatible,
laws in the absence of the clear congressional intent to do so.143
After Morrison but prior to Loginovskaya, the court in LIBOR came up with a
different set of criteria for the transactional test in the context of the CEA.144 The court
said that a claim is within the CEA’s domestic application if it involves: (1) commodities
in interstate commerce; or (2) futures contracts traded on domestic exchanges. 145
However, the LIBOR factors were not used in later decisions of the Supreme Court in
Loginovskaya and the Second Circuit’s cases when locating the domestic elements of
136. Id.
137. Id. at 309–10.
138. In re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., 332 F.Supp.3d 885, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
139. Id. at 892.
140. Id. at 919.
141. Id. at 920.
142. See Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 217 (2d
Cir. 2014).
143. Id. at 215.
144. See generally In re LIBOR–Based Fin. Instr. Antitrust Litig., 935 F.Supp.2d 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
145. Id. at 696.
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the transactional test. Given the general trend of leaning toward limiting
extraterritorial application, the LIBOR factors may not have been used by other courts
because the first factor is so broad that it would allow private actions every time there
is a commodity traded in interstate commerce, which would essentially be every case
because commodities market is a predominantly international market. The plaintiff
argued in Morrison, in favor of the rebuttal of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, that the shares were involved in interstate commerce, which is
expressly mentioned in SEA Section 10(b). 146 The Morrison court rejected this
argument, pointing out that the general reference to foreign commerce in the definition
of the “interstate commerce” does not defeat presumption against extraterritoriality.147
B. Modifying the “Conduct and Effects” Test
An alternative to the Morrison domestic transactional test is a modified
version which was proposed by a number of comment letters received by the SEC in
response to the SEC’s request for public comments regarding the application of the
transactional test to private causes of action under the securities laws. 148 The
modified version is supposed to be limited solely to U.S. resident investors. An
advantage of such a limitation would be the elimination of international comity
concerns associated with the application of the traditional “conduct and effects”
test.149 Some commentators, such as NASCAT, the Maryland State Retirement and
Pension System, New York State, and the Consolidated Retirement Fund underlined
that the federal securities laws are designed to protect U.S. investors, just like the
foreign nations are interested in protecting their own citizens and determining their
own regulatory framework to achieve this.150 At the same time, both the transactional
test and the “conduct and effects” test do not consider the nationality of investors as
the relevant factor to determine whether U.S. laws apply because such a
differentiated approach would contradict the underlying public policy that the law
applies equally to all.151
C. Fraud-in-the-Inducement Test
Another alternative to the “conduct and effects” test suggested by some is the
fraud-in-the-inducement test.152 Under this theory investors would have a cause of
action if they were in the United States when they were induced to buy or sell the

146. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 262–63 (2010).
147. Id. at 263.
148. See Cross-Border Study, supra note 23, at 55.
149. Id. (citing letters from NASCAT, Maryland State Retirement and Pension System,
New York State, and Consolidated Retirement Fund).
150. Id. at 56.
151. Id. (citing letter from Strathclyde).
152. Id. at 57 (citing letters from Forty-Two Law Professors; ABA; London Pension Funds).

Vol. 5, Summer 2019

75

Global Markets Law Journal

securities pursuant to misleading statements or fraudulent activities.153 Similarly,
the fraud-in-the-inducement test could be applied to lawsuits brought under the CEA.
Thus, if the plaintiff in Loginovskaya was induced to invest while in the United
States, she could have argued that she had a cause of action against the defendants
under the fraud-in-the-inducement theory.
D. Multi-Factor Test
In Cornwell, the court placed a lot of hope in the Morrison test, naming it a
bright-line rule which was devised to solve the inconsistencies associated with the
“conduct and effects” test.154 “The Court manifested an intent to weed the doctrine at
its roots and replace it with a new bright-line transactional rule embodying the clarity,
simplicity, certainty and consistency that the tests from the Second Circuit and other
circuits lacked.”155 However, the appropriateness of the bright-line rule in the context
of cross-border regulation is not in itself evident. In Loginovskaya the Solicitor General
suggested an alternative test that would weigh whether significant domestic conduct
was material to the fraud’s success.156 The Second Circuit acknowledged that such a
test would be admirable but rejected it as having no justification in the statutory
text.157 The Second Circuit seemed to agree that one of the CEA’s purposes is to protect
investors but nevertheless leaned toward the uniform, accurate and clear standard
rather than a multi-factor case-by-case analysis. The court’s decision could have been
motived by its desire for the United States to not become “the Shangri-La of classaction litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities
markets.”158
Another alternative test that could be used for private litigation under the CEA
is a multi-factor test suggested in Judge Leval’s concurring opinion in Parkcentral.159
Judge Leval’s concurrence in Parkcentral rejected the idea that Morrison provided
only a bright-line, single-factor test.160 He interpreted Morrison as a flexible, multifactor test and referenced Kiobel where the Supreme Court came up with the “touch
and concern” test.161 Under the “touch and concern” test, claims under the ATS could
be domestic under Morrison even if based on foreign conduct, if the claims touch and
concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.162 Since it is not clear what conduct
153. Id.
154. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F.Supp.2d 620, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
155. Id.
156. Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 271 (2014).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 218 (2d Cir.
2014) (Leval, J., concurring).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 219.
162. Id.
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can be viewed as touching and concerning the territory of the United States, this
question can hardly be the question resolved by the bright-line single-factor rule.
Judge Leval gave three reasons why he construed Morrison as allowing for the multifactor analysis. First, it is common in the choice-of-laws area to use flexible tests
instead of rigid rules because the complexity of the choice-of-law questions does not
lend itself to reliable analysis by a bright-line test.163 Second, Judge Leval argued that
the bright-line rule can be either over-inclusive or under-inclusive, i.e., either not
protecting the domestic investors and securities market, or interfering with the
foreign law jurisdiction by applying domestic laws in cases where the foreign law is
more appropriate. 164 Lastly, bright-line rules can allow leeway to bad-faith
participants who could devise methods of circumventing the clear rules and staying
on the safe side of the line.165
V. Conclusion
After-Morrison application of the domestic transactional test in the commodity
interests context suggests that the courts, while pronouncing the bright-line-rule
nature of the test, still steer away from it and seem to be taking a holistic, fact-specific
approach. This is evident from the “predominantly foreign” exception in Parkcentral,
In Re North Sea Brent Crude Oil Litigation and In Re London Solver Fixing, Ltd.
Antitrust Litigation, which seem to nullify the first prong of the Morrison test by
establishing that even if the derivative contracts are traded on the domestic exchange
in the United States, this factor alone can still be overcome if the nature of the
transaction is considered by courts as predominantly foreign. Considering the
sensitivity of the cross-border application of U.S. laws caused by the international
comity and foreign policy issues, the flexible multi-factor analysis seems to be a better
option than the bright-line rigid rule. And as such, the “conduct and effects” test
devised by the Second Circuit and representing a holistic, fact-specific approach
seems to be the best roadmap so far devised to determine the cross-border application
of the CEA.

163. Id. at 220.
164. Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 220–21 (2d
Cir. 2014) (Leval, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 221.
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